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Introduction
Community based woodland and wetland projects may be defined as specified woodland 
and wetland resources owned, managed, utilized and controlled by a defined group 
(community). An example of a group could be households in a kraal under a specific 
kraalhead. Grazing schemes were defined by Cousins (1988) as interventions aimed at, 
firstly, improving livestock productivity in communal areas, and secondly, conserving the 
vegetation cover of grazing land and reducing the risk of environmental degradation. A 
description and analysis of governance of grazing schemes in Zimbabwe with emphasis on 
those in Masvingo province was undertaken in the first part ^f this series of papers (Mugabe 
et al., 2001). The analysis revealed that problems of governance were still prevalent in most 
grazing schemes. Some of the problems identified were inadequate collective choice 
arrangements, poor definition of scheme beneficiaries, lack of congruence between 
appropriation and provision rules and local conditions, no application of graduated sanctions 
and ineffective conflict resolution mechanisms.
Cousins (1992) also reported that attempts to implement grazing schemes had always 
resulted in conflicts within local communities, between scheme members and excluded 
members, and between local communities and the state. In the analysis by Mugabe et al. 
(2001) it was noted that boundaries between grazing schemes and adjacent communal 
areas were known but not respected. To this end, Guveya and Gwata (1998) concluded 
that this was partly because grazing land in the communal lands had become an open 
access resource. This arose partly because no sanctions were imposed after boundaries 
had been violated or the grazing land abused.
In this paper, governance in community based woodland and wetland management projects 
in Masvingo Province will be reviewed. The intention is to identify similarities and difference 
in governance with those of grazing schemes. However, governance in grazing schemes 
will not be reviewed as this was done in previous publications (Cousins, 1996; Mugabe et al., 
2001). Ultimately an analysis will be done to determine any lessons that could be applied to 
improve governance in grazing schemes.
Analytical Framework
We recognize that the success of a grazing scheme or any natural common property 
resource is dependent on ecological and technical characteristics, socio-economic structure, 
power structures and institutional arrangements (Cousins 1993). In this paper, we will 
mainly address the power structures and institutional arrangements, which are related to 
governance.
Principles of Good Governance
Ostrom (1990) discussed eight design principles that characterize common property 
resource (CPR) institutions. These design principles relate to governance, since a design 
principle is an essential element or condition that helps to account for the success of these
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institutions in sustaining the CPRs and gaining the compliance of generation after generation 
of appropriators to the rules in use. These design principles are:
1. Clearly defined boundaries: individuals or households who have rights to withdraw 
resources from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must be the boundaries of the 
CPR itself.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision mles and local conditions: 
appropriator rules restricting time, place, technology and quantity of resource units 
are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labour, material and/or 
money.
3. Collective choice arrangements: most individuals affected by the operational rules 
can participate in modifying the operational rules.
4. Monitoring: monitors who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour 
are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
5. Graduated sanctions: appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be 
assessed graduated sanctions depending on the seriousness and content of the 
offence, by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators or by 
both.
6. Conflict resolution mechanism: appropriators and officials have access to low-cost 
arenas to resolve conflicts.
7. Minimal recognition o f rights to organise: the rights of appropriators to devise their 
own institution are not challenged by external government authorities.
8. Nested enterprises: appropriation provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict
resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested 
enterprises.
In this paper these design principles will be referred to and used as the “principles of good 
governance”.
Case studies of Governance in Community-based Woodland and 
Wetland Management Projects in Masvingo Province
Three woodland and wetland projects in Masvingo Province were studied. These were 
Mapendere Woodland Management Project, MaPLAN Wetland Management Project and 
Bika Woodland Management Project. W e interviewed leaders, and committee and ordinary 
members of the projects. Ordinary members were randomly selected from the lists of 
members presented by the projects. In general, we interviewed the kraalhead, at least two 
committee members and at least two ordinary members in each of the projects. Where the 
committee had men only, we deliberately selected at least two women (ordinary members) 
for the interview in each project. The interviews were informal but a check list of issues to be 
followed up had been drawn up from literature. W e observed the state of the infrastructure 
(e g., parity of fences), the conditions (e.g., ecological) of the wetland, woodlands, water 
resources, and activities in the area in an attempt, among other things, to verify claims from 
interviewees. Additional information was obtained from external agents associated with the 
projects and literature.
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1. Mapendere Woodland Management Project
initiation
This project, which was started in the early 1990s, is situated in Charumbira communal 
lands of Masvingo District. According to Matuvhunye and Munyanyi (1999) the project was 
initiated after the two villages of Mapendere and Pasi noticed a rapidly increasing 
degradation of part of a micro-catchment. This was manifested through the loss of trees, 
grass and other vegetation and the development of a gully around a spring. This spring was 
an important recharge area for the village gardens downstream. The area was also an 
important source of reeds for making baskets and mats, which were important sources of 
income. Market gardening was another important income generating activity. The two 
village communities decided to protect the micro-catchment to be assured of a continuous 
water supply that was being threatened by the degradation.
A committee was formed and was tasked to approach the Forestry Commission of 
Zimbabwe for assistance. Forestry Commission then donated barbed wire and poles to 
fence off the 16-hectare area. The committee of the project is chaired by kraalhead 
Mapendere. He appeared to be the dominant force behind the project. A constitution was 
formulated by the Forestry Commission was generally not applied.
According to the Forestry Commission (Masvingo Forestry Extension Services, 1997) there 
were 60 members in the project. During the interviews we conducted, we noted that only 18 
members were registered and active. The joining fee was Z$5.00, which some of the 
members interviewed claimed they could not raise.
The project has succeeded in rehabilitating the degraded land, regenerating the grazing and 
resuscitating the wetland. Fruit trees such as bananas and citrus have been introduced to 
the wetland to speed up the healing of the gully. Community members are no longer 
walking long distances in search of water. There is water for drinking and gardening, 
benefiting both project members and non-members. Reeds and sedges for craftwork are 
available. Bee keeping has been introduced as a catalytic move for conservation of the 
woodland because bees provide short interim benefits to the community. Poles are being 
sold for building cattle kraals and for firewood. Part of the woodland is being developed for 
livestock grazing by members of the project.
There is some division of labour. Women are responsible for collecting manure for the tree 
nursery and preparing food when people are working on the woodland. Men are responsible 
for fencing and provision of security, especially to prevent poaching of timber and sedges 
from the woodland.
W e identified problem areas related to governance. Cooperation, especially between kraals, 
appeared to be weak. Some of the members of the community who were interviewed were 
not happy with the name “Mapendere” for the project, as it was associated with an individual 
member of the community (kraalhead Mapendere). Kraalhead Mapendere was more active 
than kraalhead Pasi. He appeared to be the visionary of the project and all activities centred 
around him. Kraalhead Mapendere had this to say: “I call upon the people of Zimbabwe to 
conserve their sacred places and forests so that wildlife returns, otherwise future 
generations will see these animals in books like what is happening in other countries". 
However, because of domination by kraalhead Mapendere, members of the project from 
Mapendere kraal were cutting down trees and grazing their livestock without the project 
community consensus. There were complaints that the constitution was not being adhered 
to. The youth in the area were not involved in this project.
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Analysis of governance in Mapendere Woodland Project
The role of the Forestry Commission was advisory and facilitatory which gave the 
community the right to organize. The project has clearly defined boundaries. Membership 
of the project was clearly defined but some benefits such as irrigation water also accrued to 
the entire community, and not just to project members. The dwindling number of paid up 
members was, however, a cause for concern. This may have indicated some internal 
resistance to the idea of paying for a natural resource. This could be interpreted as a 
violation of Ostrom's principle of congruence between appropriation rules and local 
conditions.
There was evidence that collective choice arrangements, monitoring, application of 
graduated sanctions and conflict resolution mechanisms were limited or weak. The 
constitution included all these aspects but adherence to the constitution was not evident
The violation of the rules of the project by members from Mapendere kraal and the 
frustration of the Pasi people brings into question the effectiveness of monitoring and 
collective choice arrangements, imposition of graduated sanctions and conflict resolution 
mechanisms. We had the impression that the dominance of kraaihead Mapendere was to 
the detriment of democratic processes in the project. It is inconceivable how the project will 
be governed in the event of the departure of kraaihead Mapendere. The people of 
Mapendere seemed to be taking advantage of the dominance of their kraaihead to secure a 
greater share of the benefits from the scheme, if not abuse the woodland. The Pasi people 
did not seem to have any recourse since their kraaihead was not as imposing as kraaihead 
Mapendere.
Despite these problems, the project demonstrated a variety of benefits that can accrue to 
the community. The obvious material benefits could be used to motivate community 
members and promote sustainability of the project. Failure to involve the youth was a 
weakness. Involving the youth could lead the project to posterity and continuity since all age 
groups in the community would be conscious of the purpose and benefit of the project.
2. MaPLAN Wetland Project
This project is one of several projects in Chief Charumbira’s area in Masvingo District. The 
various projects in the area form the MaPLAN Conservation Union.
initiation
The MaPLAN Wetland Project was claimed to be the brainchild of Mr. Makasi, a community 
member. Mr. Makasi discussed the issue of land degradation, deforestation and 
unavailability of water with the councillor, Member of Parliament, and community elders in 
the area. The community then approached the Forestry Commission, the Department of 
Natural Resources, AGRITEX (agricultural extension department), the Ministry of National 
Affairs and Employment Creation, and the MaPLAN council of elders, which is in charge of 
the MaPLAN Conservation Union. The project was started in 1990.
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Power structures and institutional arrangements
Four kraals are participating in the project. The project is governed by a constitution 
prescribed by the MaPLAN Conservation Union. The constitution and union concept were 
the brainchild of the Association of Zimbabwean Traditional Conservation (AZTREC), a non­
governmental organization.
The constitution prescribes a hierarchy of committees. It states, among other things, the 
objects, membership, committees, office bearers, and scheduling of meetings. The 
constitution is, in our view rather elaborate and has the following objectives, among others:
1. To preserve and protect the traditional way of life in Charumbira and Zimbabwe as a 
whole
2. To rehabilitate vlei and spring wetlands reclaim gullies and manage woodlands 
(sacred and ordinary)
3. To establish an eco-tourism industry through conservation of flora and fauna and 
establishment of a cultural village
4. To raise and source funds from states, donors, regional and international authorities, 
individuals and others to support community projects.
Membership in any of the projects within the union is open to local citizens interested in 
traditional environmental conservation. All ages and gender should be considered for 
membership. Members pay a joining fee of Z$80-00, and groups (projects) contribute Z$60- 
00 per year as a membership fee which would be used as emergency funds. Membership 
could be terminated by non-payment of subscriptions, majority vote of the Council of Elders 
or at the Annual General Meeting. The project is served by several committees namely: the 
council of elders, the implementation committee and group committees. There is also a 
disciplinary committee and a youth committee.
The council of elders is composed of the chief who is the chairperson, headmen, kraalheads 
and influential elders. The Chairperson appoints a secretary who represents him in the 
implementation committee. The council of elders is the supreme authority in the projects 
and has responsibility for financial management and control in the projects and appointing a 
coordinator. The chief always signs for any withdrawal of funds but two other signatories are 
also required.
The implementation committee has a two-year term of office unlike the council of elders, 
which is somewhat permanent. This committee is responsible for supervision, monitoring 
and evaluation of project activities, among other responsibilities. The chairperson of this 
committee should be a group committee chairperson. All the chairpersons of group 
committees are members of the implementation committee. The implementation committee 
supervises a secretariat that is led by the coordinator.
Group committee terms of office and structure are similar to those of the implementation 
committee. The committee is elected by group members at kraal level and has 
responsibilities similar to those of the implementation committee but at group level (village 
project level). The group committee is responsible for local environment conservation 
activities. The MaPLAN Wetland Project is an example of a group, run by a group 
committee. Mr Makasi, who was instrumental in the initiation of the project, is the 
chairperson of the group.
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The disciplinary committee chancels, and attends to the grievances of members of the 
Union. It is led by the chief (Chairperson of the Council of Elders) and is comprised of 
respected elders and the chairperson of the implementation committee.
The youth committee has the same terms of office as the group committees. The 
chairperson is a member of the implementation committee. The committee compiles all 
youth projects and its members serve as tour guides for project visitors. It also assists in the 
implementation of projects at group level.
Some benefits have accrued to the community. The water source has been conserved and 
does not dry up during the dry season. Reeds and medicinal herbs are being harvested 
from the area. The grass is used for thatching and grazing is available for use by livestock. 
Fishponds and vegetable gardens have been established. Siltation has been minimized. 
Water in pools is valued for church baptisms. The area is visibly rehabilitated with 
resurgence of tree and reed growth.
Moyo (1997) reported some strengths that were noted by participants at a workshop who 
visited the MaPLAN conservation project. There was active traditional leadership and a 
high level of community commitment. Community efforts were fuelled by strong links to 
tradition and culture. This respect of tradition appeared to unite people in the area. During 
our interviews we made similar observations and discovered that the wetland was regarded 
as a sacred place. The involvement of youth was encouraging and a unique feature of the 
project.
Some concerns about the project and its weaknesses were presented to us. There was 
some misunderstanding within the community. Some members said that there was too 
much interference from AZTREC. Political differences (factionalism) had become so serious 
that project operations had been suspended in 1999. Although Mr Makasi was the 
chairman, the secretary was said to have taken a leading role for political reasons. 
Enforcement of by-laws was at times executed by the chiefs security guard and not from 
within the community. This did not go down well with some members of the project.
Moyo (1997) also reported some weaknesses in the conservation project in general. There 
were weaknesses in record keeping and the evaluation of project activities. There was no 
equity in project activities, for example, gardens. Individual gardens were disproportionate in 
size and this was neither desirable for equity nor for conservation of land.
Analysis of Governance in the MaPLAN Wetland Project
Most of the principles of good governance are satisfied in the MaPLAN wetland project. 
There are strong nested enterprises and monitoring. However, the hierarchical committee 
structure appears to be somewhat alien to the community. Complaints of too much 
interference by AZTREC could be an indication of a violation of Ostrom's design principle on 
the minimum recognition of the community's right to govern. If AZTREC is excessively 
involved, there is a danger of the project collapsing when it pulls out, as seen in many 
grazing schemes. The numerous committees and the existence of a secretariat can easily 
swell up the overhead costs and threaten the survival of the project.
The conflicts due to political differences seem to have permeated the committees, all the 
way down from the council of elders to group committees. W e believe that the hierarchy of 
committees would normally facilitate conflict resolution but in this case, a complex scenario 
was created. National and provincial government politics filtered down through the 
committees to the members in the projects. These developments led to the suspension of
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project activities. This shows that existence of a hierarchy of committees can result in mixed 
agendas and manipulation of members of a project to the advantage of certain individuals.
The dominance of the traditional leaders and the linkage of the project to the preservation of 
sacred forests and ancestral spirits brought respect to the project. Unfortunately, this led to 
a problem of poor congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions. There was more preservation than a balance of preservation and utilization. 
The communities worked very hard but they seemed to get little tangible returns. It was 
noted that there was inadequate fodder for livestock for the dry season, despite under­
utilization of the grazing resources in the wetland conservation project. This is not 
sustainable and is unwise because if members do not get some benefits there is no reason 
for them to maintain their membership. According to Murphree (1991), there must be a 
positive correlation between quality and quantity of management and the magnitude of 
benefit
3. Bika Woodland Management Project
This is situated near Bondolfi Mission in Masvingo District about 25 km south of Masvingo 
town. The project is in headman Bika's area and is located in Chibaya village.
Initiation
This project was started in the mid 1980’s but activities were stepped up in 1989, when 
serious efforts were put in place to arrest the development of a gully. Massive community 
mobilization about the impending danger of the developing gully through the powerful 
traditional leadership resulted in the reduction of disorganized farming activities in the gully 
area. Headman Zvashura Mazvidza Bika was the man behind the successful 
implementation of the project.
After banning of farming along the gully area, 27 hectares of land surrounding the gully were 
fenced off in 1992 when the community received fencing material from the Forestry 
Commission of Zimbabwe. The villages that were affected by the fencing off of the gully 
were relocated. The fenced off area was originally a sacred place and the custodian of the 
local community’s culture and traditions. Efforts to protect the sacred wetland were said to 
have started in the 1940s but these efforts had been disturbed by settlement in the area 
during the colonial era and liberation war.
Power structures and institutional arrangements
A project committee was established at the initiation of the project and headman Bika was 
chosen to lead this committee. Headman Bika stepped down as chairman in 1997 due to 
poor health. He is said to have commanded a great deal of respect in the area.
Within the project area were crop fields and gardens. The affected community members 
were asked to stop using them and compensation was agreed on. A consolidated 
community garden was established and a borehole was to be sunk outside the project area 
to give an alternate water source to a well that was in the project area. The movement of 
people and relocation of gardens and fields out of the area created some conflicts with a 
neighbouring village but were quashed by headman Bika. An individual who was living near 
the project area had to be displaced and this was done through the community leadership.
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The Forestry Commission compensated the displaced person. A borehole was drilled but 
not to the right depth due to administrative problems. It has not been completed to date; 
hence, water has to be fetched from a stream in the woodland, some 50 metres from the 
garden.
Some benefits have accrued to the community. Firewood is now available, and poles and 
grass for building can be harvested from the woodland. Water for irrigation of gardens is 
now available. Traditional healers are also getting herbs from the woodland. The project 
has succeeded in reclaiming the gully, regenerated the vegetation and may have improved 
biodiversity.
There are some concerns about the Bika woodland management project. The project does 
not appear to have had an impact on the management of other woodland areas in the 
Headman Bika's area. The trend towards degradation in these other woodlands is apparent 
but the communities are not taking action to control or contain the degradation. The utility of 
the project to the community does not appear to have been emphasized. The village elders 
keep on emphasizing the spiritual and ancestral importance of the project and for this 
reason the community has not been successful in its request that the project area be used 
for the grazing of livestock.
Analysis of Governance in Bika woodland management project
This project demonstrates the power of traditional leaders and ancestral and spiritual beliefs. 
Considering the principles of governance, boundaries were clearly defined. Monitoring, 
imposition of sanctions and conflict resolution were evident. However, all these activities 
centred on headman Bika. Collective choice arrangements appeared to be limited. The 
refusal by the village elders to allow livestock to graze in the project area despite pleas from 
the community is a good example. This creates the impression that the custodians of the 
wetland project are not the community members but the headman and the village elders.
Reporting on the project, Matuvhunye and Munyanyi (1997) noted that traditional institutions 
could be very powerful entry points and effective tools for project implementation. In 
addition, traditional institutions centre around individuals (the traditional leaders) and this 
could bring complications. Should the leader die or is incapacitated, there will be far 
reaching impacts on the project as “the centre" will no longer hold. It is also possible for the 
leader to direct things for his personal glory. People can get frog marched into projects they 
do not belieye in. Other lessons were that sentimental values (spirrtual/aesthetic) do not 
always excite young people who have the energy to work. They also present contradictions 
of using modem technologies “to get back to the past”. Measurements of direct benefits 
become problematic. Ideally, a project should be designed to address the genuine needs of 
the people. In addition, the empowerment of target groups is important in handling socio­
economic cultural dynamics and project management. The ultimate lesson from the Bika 
woodland management project is that the protection of a project area can create an 
ownership and accounting stance, which leads to evident physical outputs.
The Bika woodland management project did not demonstrate nested enterprises, as is 
considered ideal. This may not have been necessary because of the dominance and 
general acceptance of the traditional leadership. The headman’s judgement appeared to 
have been accepted as final in all instances.
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Comparison of Governance in Grazing Schemes and in the Three 
Woodland and Wetland Projects
The governance comparisons made here are not exhaustive. They relate to the community 
based natural resource management projects we reviewed. Ultimately, the essence of the 
comparison is to identify strengths in the CBNRM regimes that could be useful in improving 
governance in grazing schemes (our main interest).
In all the three woodland and wetland projects, boundaries were clearly defined. This is not 
like most grazing schemes where the issue of boundaries, especially between the grazing 
schemes and adjacent communal areas has been a cause of conflict. The dominance of 
traditional leaders and the ancestral and spiritual attachment to woodland and wetland 
projects appears to have promoted respect for boundaries. In the management of these 
resources, benefits accruing to the community are generally not conditional or dependent on 
ownership of resources such as cattle. These community resources are often required by all 
the community members. This reduces potential areas of conflict.
In both grazing schemes and woodland/wetland projects there was limited congruence 
between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions. In the woodland/wetland 
projects benefits that should have been realised by the community were not being offered 
fully despite the availability of resources. There appeared to be more emphasis on 
protection and not balancing protection and utilisation. Most communities were working hard 
in the management of the natural resources but their livestock were not being allowed to 
utilise the grazing available.
In the grazing schemes considered there was evidence of structures allowing for collective 
choice arrangements. In the woodland/wetland projects there appeared to be less of this 
due to the pivotal and dominant roles of traditional leaders. Ultimately the impression 
created was that the traditional leaders were the custodians of the common property 
resources, especially woodlands. This custodianship had some implied ownership of the 
resource by the traditional leadership. Sanctions could thus be imposed on violations of 
boundaries or abuse of the common prope: ly resource. As long as ancestry spiritualism 
and traditional leaders were still respected, the common property resource was likely to be 
respected. Of concern was the limited involvement of youth, except in MaPLAN. If the 
youth are not involved it is doubtful whether they will continue to respect the traditional 
leadership, ancestral attachment and spiritualism required to take the common property 
resources into “eternity”.
/
Monitoring in grazing schemes has mostly been weak. This has not been the case with the 
woodland/wetland resources which have been monitored closely. The security guards of the 
traditional leaders have been actively involved in policing. The intervention by the security 
guards and the existence of the kraalheads and headman’s courts allow for imposition of 
sanctions on abusers of the common property resources. Such “courts” are not apparent in 
grazing schemes because the powers of traditional leaders were normally within the orbits of 
the grazing committees.
Woodland and wetland projects appear to have strength in being able to compose 
graduated sanctions and in conflict resolution mechanisms. These were rather deficient in 
moSt grazing schemes. It appears that the pivotal role played by traditional leaders provided 
for the imposition of sanctions and for conflict resolution.
In both grazing schemes and woodland/wetland projects there was some evidence of 
minimal recognition of rights to organise. Most external agents that have assisted grazing 
schemes have insisted on the formation of grazing scheme committees to organise activities
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within the schemes. Regulatory frameworks to allow for democratic process have been 
established in virtually every grazing scheme. The communities may have failed to follow 
the guidelines but the regulatory framework exists. The reasons for communities not 
following guidelines that are intended to empower them to organise themselves may be the 
result of the guidelines deriving from external agents. The suggested guidelines or 
proposed institutions could have been alien to the community. Institutions proposed by 
external agents may not relate to traditional institutions. In the woodland/wetland projects 
we noted that institutions were organised around traditional leaders. External agents such 
as the Forestry Commission appeared to play advisory and technical roles. Perhaps, the 
institutions' tasks should be centred around traditional leaders. Such an institution is easily 
understood and respected by the community.
In some grazing schemes and woodland/wetland projects nested enterprises were evident. 
Some of these enterprises were complex with a hierarchy of committees as in the MaPLAN 
Conservation Union and in the World Vision assisted grazing schemes in Mashonaland 
Central Province (Paradza, 1990; Mugabe et. al., 2001). It appears that multiple layers of 
enterprises can bring risks to the operation of projects. Conflicts at a high level can filter 
down to the ground and cause problems at the operational level. The woodland projects, 
Mapendere and Bika, were run by committees that were led by traditional leaders. The 
committees seemed to be effective despite the absence of higher authorities.
It appears that inclusion of traditional leaders in committees could be effective provided the 
traditional leaders can be allowed to exercise their traditional powers in the event of an 
impasse.
Conclusion
The woodland/wetland projects had dearly defined boundaries. The dominance of 
traditional leaders and the ancestral and spiritual attachment to these natural resources 
appear to have promoted respect for boundaries. Distribution of benefits in the projects was 
rather limited despite the abundance of resources. Thus, there was overemphasis on 
protection of resources instead of balandng resource protection and utilization. Collective 
choice arrangements were limited to the dominant role of traditional leaders.
Monitoring, imposition of graduated sanctions and conflict resolution mechanisms in 
CBNRMs were generally effective. The pivotal role played by traditional leaders provided for 
the imposition of sanctions and for conflict resolution.
There was some evidence of minimal recognition of rights to organize in the 
woodland/wetland projects. However, institutions were organised around traditional leaders. 
External agents had a rather peripheral advisory, technical role. In some woodland/wetland 
projects nested enterprises were evident, such as the hierarchy of committees in the 
MaPLAN conservation project. It appears that a multiple of enterprises can bring risks to 
operation and survival of projects. The simple committee headed by a traditional leader was 
effective in Mapendere and Bika suggesting that inclusion of traditional leaders with full 
powers to adjudicate is desirable.
Governance of the woodland CBNRMs differed from that of grazing schemes with regard to 
the role of traditional leaders and sentimental values. In the woodland/wetland projects 
traditional leaders played a pivotal role, which facilitated the definition of boundaries, 
imposition of graduated sanctions and conflict resolution. It was evident that traditional 
institutions could be powerful entry points and effective tools for project implementation and 
management. Traditional leaders have not always been included in all grazing schemes
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and at times their power within grazing scheme committees has been dictated by 
constitutions (often drafted by external agents). Adjudication of powers of traditional leaders 
in most grazing schemes do not appear to have been respected and are often dampened 
by the presence of local governance politicians (e.g., Councillor).
The spiritual and ancestral value of woodland and wetland resources is not often associated 
with grazing schemes. There is need to evaluate the potential benefits that could be derived 
from the protected woodlands. Woodland grasses and trees could be harvested for feeding 
livestock during the dry season if grazing of livestock in the sacred woodlands is considered 
sacrosanct. This could be a practical option considering that most woodland conservation 
projects have been successful.
Some of the projects do not involve the youth. This should be considered as it promotes 
project posterity. It appears that multi-layered enterprises can bring the risk of excessive 
control, which may not be desirable. Nested enterprises are likely to succeed if they are 
within the established and well-known traditional governance structures.
, \.
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